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THE COMMON LAW CONSTRUCT OF NATIVE TITLE

A 're-feudalisation' of Australian land law
Scott Grattan and Luke McNamard"

Recent scholarship has interpreted the recognition of
native title in Mabo and Wik as bringing about a decisive
break between Australian land law and its feudal past. In
this article we argue that once attention is shifted from the
Crown's interest in native title land to the interest of the
native title holders themselves, a very different picture
emerges. This article argues that the common law
construct of native title constitutes a 're-feudalisation' of
Australian land law. We assert that native title can be
understood as a product of a series of dialectics: public
and private; stasis and dynamism; and transcendence and
enslavement. We demonstrate that the dialectic nature of
native title gives it the hallmarks of a feudal interest in
land, that is, an interest that is contingent, limited and
susceptible to co-existence with other interests.

IntroductionThe landmark High Court cases dealing with the rights of Indigenous
peoples in land in Australia - Mabo v Queensland(No 2) and Wik Peoples v
Queensland - were each met with a legislative response in the form of the
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) and the Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth),'
respectively. However, the Native Title Act continues to use as its fundament
in the recognition, protection and extinguishment of Indigenous rights in
*
**

1
2
3
4

Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong
Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong
* This article is the product of a larger project on the legal concept of native title
conducted by the authors with the support of an Australian Research Council
Small Grant. We thank David Jones for his research assistance in relation to
that project. This article has also benefited from the presentation of a paper at
the 17th Annual Law and History Conference: Empires/Colonies/Legal
Cultures, Melbourne, 3-5 July 1998.
Mabo v Queensland(No 2)(1992) 175 CLR 1 (hereafter Mabo).
Wik Peoples v Queensland(1996) 187 CLR 1 (hereafter Wik).
See Yarmirr v Northern Territory (1998) 156 ALR 370 (hereafter Yarmirr) at
385.
See RH Bartlett, 'A Return to Dispossession and Discrimination: The Ten
Point Plan' (1997b) 27 UWALR 44, pp 49-51, for a consideration of the history
of, and the motivation behind, the Native Title Amendment Bill 1997, the
precursor to the Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth).
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land' the concept of native title as expounded by the common law.' And this
concept - which we refer to in this paper as the 'common law construct of
native title'7 - has in recent times been the subject of judicial attention in
Australia on several occasions. The Federal Court has handed down three
lengthy judgments concerning native title: Yarmirr v Northern Territory,
Ward v Western Australia; and Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v
Victoria' The High Court has again contributed to the jurisprudence with
its decision in Fejo v Northern Territory.' In Canada as well, the nature of

Indigenous ownership of land has been re-examined by that country's
Supreme Court in Delgamuukw v British Columbia' The implications of

that decision are still being debated." These developments reveal that the
process of 'unpacking' and explaining the nature of the common law
construct of native title is an ongoing one.

5

See, for example, Native Title Act ss 10-13.

6

See the definition of 'native title' and 'native title rights and interests' in the

7

8

9
10
11

Native Title Acts 223 (1). Also see Yarmirr at 386-387. It must be noted that in
Yarmirr, Olney J held that the Native Title Act allows for the recognition of
native title in at least one context where native title would not be recognised by
the Australian common law. According to his Honour, the Act permits the
recognition of native title in offshore waters (at 388-389). This is despite the
fact that the common law would not afford such recognition because the
common law of Australia does not extend offshore. His Honour held that the
Act provides a statutory basis for the recognition of such offshore rights,
provided they are of a type that would have been recognised by the common
law had the territorial restriction not applied.
We prefer to describe 'native title' as a common law construct because the
reception of native title into the common law has not been an act of passive
recognition of Indigenous relationships with land as they exist under relevant
Indigenous law. Instead, in transforming Indigenous relationships with land
through the institution of native title, by giving those relationships
characteristics they do not have under Indigenous law - such as susceptibility
to extinguishment - the courts have initiated a process of creation (or
construction). See I Hunter (1994) 'Native Title: Acts of State and the Rule of
Law' in M Groot and T Rowse (eds) Make a Better Offer: The Politics of Mabo,
Pluto Press, p 107; and L McNamara and S Grattan, 'The Recognition of
Indigenous Land Rights as "Native Title": Continuity and Transformation'
(forthcoming) FlindersJL Reform.
Yarmirr, Ward v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483 (hereafter Ward); Yorta
Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (unreported, Federal Court of
Australia, 18 December 1998) (hereafter Yorta Yorta).
Fejo v Northern Territory(1998) 156 ALR 721 (hereafter Fejo).
Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010 (hereafter Delgamuukw).
See S Persky (1998) Delgamuuk.m The Supreme Court Decision on Aboriginal
Title, Greystone Books; and RH Bartlett, 'The Content and Proof of Native
Title: Delgamuukw v Queen in right of British Columbid (1998a) 4(9) Indig L
Bull 17.
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Statement of aims
This article has two aims. The first is to highlight the dialectic" nature of the
common law construct of native title. We will demonstrate - in three
contexts - that the characteristics that the common law impresses upon the
concept of native title are a function of the tension between various oppositional categories." These categories are: public/private; stasis/dynamism; and
transcendence/enslavement. By this we mean that ] the construct of native
title:

0 unevenly treats the distinction between the public and private
spheres by both dislocatingand fusing these spheres;
0

is located in a normative system (the Australian common law)
which gives native title a static content, but which appropriates for
its own vision of property rights a dynamic content; and

0

both transcends,and is enslaved by, the common law's own vision of
property rights.

The second aim of this article is explain how the dialectic nature of the
construct of native title in these contexts constitutes a 're feudalisation' of
Australian land law. We use this somewhat inelegant term as a shorthand
description of the way in which the characteristics given to native title by
the common law are analogous to land ownership in the feudal era. 4 We are
well aware that the prevailing view is that the recognition of native title in
Mabo and the refinement of that recognition in Wik have constituted a decisive break between Australian land law and its feudal past.'5 These events
may be perceived as a 'de-feudalisation' of Australian land law. This defeudalisation is seen to have arisen out of a dilution of the doctrine of tenure
12

We use this term in the Hegelian sense - admittedly shorn of some of its
complexity and richness - to denote a concept ('synthesis') which is the
product of the interplay between two other contradictory concepts ('thesis' and
'antithesis'): P Singer (1993) Hegel, Oxford University Press, pp 77-80.

13

We have elsewhere explored other examples of this phenomenon in relation to
the origins of native title (whether it pre-dates or post-dates colonisation) and
its content (whether it is uniform or variable): McNamara and Grattan
(forthcoming). Lee Godden has considered the dialectic nature of native title in
the context of its precedential status in terms of the 'change/immobility
paradox': L Godden, 'Wilc Legal Memory and History' (1997b) 6 Griffith LR
123, esp pp 140-1.
For a discussion of the idea of feudalism together with its representation in
history and law, see M Stuckey, 'Feudalism and Australian Land Law: "A
Shadowy, Ghostlike Survival"?' (1994) 13 TasmaniaLR 102.
See, for example, B Edgeworth, 'Tenure, Allodialism and Indigenous Rights at
Common Law: English, United States and Australian Land Law Compared
after Mabo v Queensland' (1994) 23 Anglo-Am LR 397; L Godden, 'Wik:
Feudalism, Capitalism and the State' (1997a) 5 A ust Prop LJ 162; and N Bhuta,
'Mabo, Wik and the Art of Paradigm Management' (1998) 22 Melb ULR 24.

14

15
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in Mabo and Wik from the position accepted in England. Edgeworth explains
the distinction between the rights of the Crown under English and
Australian land law after Mabo as follows.
[T]he Mabo decision has applied some radical surgery to the enlarged,
fictional definition of the doctrine of tenure, and has accorded the
Crown in Australia a significantly more modest role in the structure
of land law. Far from the enduring British image of its being
universal occupant and ultimate source of all interests in land, the
Crown in Australia is held to have only acquired beneficial
ownership of indigenous land where the owners' rights were extinguished in favour of the Crown.... Equally importantly, indigenous
landholders whose rights have not been extinguished do not in any
sense hold their rights 'of' the Crown: 'title', in whatever form it is
held according to their laws, has always been and continues to be
allodial."
There are thus two aspects of Mabo's weakening of the Crown's position under the doctrine of tenure. First, in acquiring sovereignty over
various parts of Australia, the Crown did not also acquire beneficial owner-

ship of (that is, property in) the land. Secondly, the Crown is not the font of
all beneficial interests in land. The majority in Wik confirmed the diluted

nature of the Crown's tenurial interest by refusing to accept that the
Crown's interest expanded into beneficial ownership upon the granting of a
statutory leasehold interest.

We do not disagree with the foregoing view about the de-feudalisation
of Australian land law brought about by the recognition of native title.

However, we contend that once the emphasis is shifted from the nature of
the Crown's interest in land to the interest of the native title holders, then a
'counter narrative"' of re-feudalisation emerges. The common law construct
of native title bears three characteristics that Macpherson sees as the hallmarks of ownership interests in land under feudalism. These characteristics

are: the conditionality of the interest on the 'performance of [some] social
function'; the limited nature of the interest; and amenability of the interest
to co-exist with other ownership interests in the same land. This stands in
stark contrast to property rights under capitalism which are 'not conditional
upon the owner's performance of any social function', absolute and
exclusive."9
16
17
18

19

Edgeworth (1994) p 432.
Bhuta (1998) p 35; Godden (1997a) pp 169-70.
Our use of this term is inspired by Patrick Macklem, who used this-temit to
describe an alternate - and preferred - explanation to the dominant one (the
'narrative') about the dispossession of Aboriginal people in Canada and the
place of the law in addressing this injustice: P Macklem, 'What's Law Got To
Do With It?: The Protection of Aboriginal Title in Canada' (1997) 35 Osgoode
HallLJ 125.
CB Macpherson (1975) 'Capitalism and the Changing Concept of Property' in
E Kamenka and RS Neale (eds) Feudalism, Capitalism and Beyond Australian

HeinOnline -- 8 Griffith L. Rev. 53 1999

54

GRIFFITH LAW REVIEW (1 999) VOL 8 No 1

Structure of article
In order to achieve the aims of demonstrating both the dialectic nature of
native title and how it constitutes a re-feudalisation of Australian land law,
this article will consist of three sections. Each section will describe one of the
three chosen aspects of the dialectic nature and one of the three feudal
characteristics of the common law construct of native title. The second
section will deal with the public/private dialectic and will also demonstrate
how the common law construct of native title is conditional upon the
performance of a social function. The stasis/dynamism dialectic will then be
considered, and the limited content of the construct noted. In the final
section, the transcendence/enslavement dialectic will be addressed, and the
co-existence characteristic discussed.
The Public/Private Distinction in Native Title Law
In this section, our argument is not simply that the common law construct
of native title blurs the distinction between 'public' and 'private'. After all,
these concepts are hardly homogenous, ' and property ownership has both
public and private aspects in numerous contexts.' Our thesis is that the
common law both dislocates and fuses the concepts of public and private in
the recognition of native title in a way that works towards the continuation
of Indigenous disadvantage.
Prior to our analysis, we want to make two disclaimers. First, we are
not commenting upon how the concepts of 'public' and 'private' are represented in Indigenous legal cultures.2 Our concern is the contradictory
treatment of the distinction in the common law construct of native title.
Secondly, we will not attempt a concrete or universally valid definition
of public and private. For this we do not apologise; leading legal scholars
have felt able to analyse the distinction without providing such a definition."

20
21

National University Press, pp 109-10.
SI Benn and GF Gaus (1993) 'The Public and the Private: Concepts and Action'
in SI Benn and GF Gaus (eds) Public and Privatein Social Life, Croom Helm, p
3.
One example of this is title to land held under the Torrens system. The
recording and guarantee of title by the state gives the system a distinct public
flavour, whereas the ability of people to create and transfer interests in the land
outside the scheme of registration maintains the private aspect of the system.
Another example is the regulation of land use, which has both public (eg
environmental and zoning laws) and private (eg the tort of nuisance) aspects.

22

23

We consider the meaning of the terms 'private' and 'public' in the text
accompanying notes 24- 25.
Some of the perils which would be associated with such an attempt are
discussed in M Krygier (1993) 'Publicness, Privateness and "Primitive Law"' in
SI Benn and GF Gaus (eds) Public and Private in Social Life, Croom Helm, pp
334-7.
See, for example, D Kennedy, 'The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private
Distinction' (1982) 130 U Penn LR 1349; MJ Horwitz, 'The History of the
Public/Private Distinction' (1982) 130 U Penn LR 1423; and GE Frug, 'The
City as a Legal Concept' (1980) 93 Harv LR 1057. Our attention was drawn to

HeinOnline -- 8 Griffith L. Rev. 54 1999

GRATTAN

& MCNAMARA." COMMON LAW CONSTRUCT OF NATIVE TITLE

55

For our purposes, it is sufficient to operate at a high level of abstraction. By
'private', we connote a space where the preferences and desires of individuals
or groups are permitted to dominate." Certainly, such preferences and
desires are constrained in this space, but the rationale for such constraint is
respect for the preferences and desires of others. By 'public', we connote a
space where the preferences and desires of individuals and groups are
2
subordinated to a 'prior normative vision' of a proper social ordering.
Although this normative vision may find expression in the commands of the
state, it may also do so in a set of cultural or religious rules.
1

Dislocating the public and the private
In articulating the concept of native title in the Mabo case, the High Court
6
dislocated or 'decisively severed' the public and private spheres. This was
achieved by distinguishing between questions of sovereignty and questions
of property. Sovereignty - the subordination of the individual to the
command of the state- - is the archetypal public sphere concept. Property,
on the other hand, has traditionally been regarded as primarily a private
sphere concept where the owner is entitled to use his or her property as he
or she wishes.' Taking the judgment of Brennan J as broadly representative
of the majority's decision in this context, we will now note three ways in
which the High Court in Mabo dislocated the public sphere of sovereignty
and the private sphere of property rights.
First, a sharp division was made between the spheres on the issue of
justiciability. Although the issue of the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty
over various parts of Australia was held not to be justiciable in the Australian courts, the issue of the consequences of the acquisition of sovereignty
for pre-existing property rights clearly was.'
Secondly, the High Court rejected the argument put forward by
Queensland that would have merged the public and private spheres. This
argument was that in acquiring sovereignty over the Murray Islands, the
Crown also gained beneficial ownership over those lands, thereby extinguishing the pre-existing property rights of the Indigenous inhabitants. In
the words of Brennan J, '[i]t is only the fallacy of equating sovereignty and
beneficial ownership of land that gives rise to the notion that native title is
extinguished by the acquisition of sovereignty'.'

25

these texts by B Bennet, 'The Economics of Wifing Services: Law and
Economics on the Family' (1991) 18 JLaw &Soc'y206.
GS Alexander (1997) Commodity and Propriety,University of Chicago Press, p
1.
Ibid, p 2.

26
27

Edgeworth (1994) p 413.
See, for example, J Austin (1955) The Provence of JurisprudenceDetermined,orig

28

See, for example, W Blackstone (1966) Commentaries on the Laws of England,

24

1832, ed HLA Hart, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, pp 193-6.

29

reprint of 1"edn, vol 2, Dawsons, p 2.
Mabo at 32, 57 per Brennan J (Mason CJ and McHugh J concurring).

30

Ibid at 51.
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The third way in which the High Court dislocated the public and the
private spheres in the recognition of native title relates to the status it gave to
Indigenous law and custom. Although the High Court expressly located the
source and the content of native title in 'the traditional laws acknowledged
by and the traditional customs observed by the [relevant] indigenous
inhabitants'," the operation of these laws and customs is confined to the
private sphere of property rights. As a manifestation of traditional law and
custom, native title operates, according to Brennan J, as a 'burden on the
Crown's radical title when the Crown acquires sovereignty over [a] territory'.' The term 'burden' connotes the concept of encumbrance, that is, a
limited form of property right. Additionally, the private dimension of this
phenomenon is underscored by the reference to the radical title, rather than
the sovereignty, of the Crown. It is the quasi-property right ' of the Crown
which has been constrained, rather than the Crown's sovereign right to
command.
Understood in this way, Indigenous law and custom might be given
effect to in the private sphere context of traditional land use. Indeed,
Australian courts have been prepared to entertain arguments that forms of
land use which come within the protection of native title are privileged
against the operation of State legislation regulating resource exploitation.'
By contrast, the courts have not been prepared to entertain the possibility
that Indigenous law and custom might be given effect to in the public
sphere. The High Court has rejected out of hand arguments that Indigenous
law and custom may be the source of a sovereign or quasi-sovereign right of
self-government giving Aboriginal people a general immunity from State and
Commonwealth law to which they have not consented. 5
31
32
33
34

35

Ibid at 58 per BrennanJ.
Ibid at 51.
See the text accompanying notes 37-42.
See Mason v Tritton (1994) 34 NSWLR 572; Derschaw v Sutton (1997) 17 WAR
419; and Dillon v Davies (1998) 156 ALR 142. Each of these cases considered the
issue of whether fishing pursuant to native title rights was a good defence to
alleged criminal breaches of State fishing laws. In each case, it was found that
the respective defendants had not proven that they were exercising native title
rights. Section 211 of the Native Title Act now provides a level of exemption
for non-commercial fishing pursuant to native title rights. On these matters, see
P Jeffery, 'Escaping the Net: Native Title as a Defence to Breaches of the
Fishing Laws' (1997) 20 UNSWLJ352.
Coe v The Commonwealth (1993) 68 ALJR 110 at 115; and Walker v New South
Wales (1994) 182 CLR 45. See N Pearson (1993) '204 Years of Invisible Title' in
MA Stephenson and S Ratnapala (eds) Mabo: A JudicialRevolution, University
of Queensland Press, pp 82-3. We do not regard the recent decision of Police v
Yunupingu (unreported, Magistrates' Court, Darwin, 20 February 1998) as
signalling a sea change in this respect. In this case - as noted by Ron Levy in
'Native Title and the Criminal Law: The Defence of Galarrwuy Yunupingu'
(1998) 4(13) Indigs L Bull 10 - one of the bases for Mr Yunupingu being
acquitted of assault and property offences was that the conduct with which he
was charged was done in the exercise of his native title rights. However, the
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We have seen how the High Court has dislocated the public and private
spheres by employing a sharp distinction between sovereignty and property.
We will shortly proceed to examine the other part of the dialectic, namely
the way in which the High Court in Mabo also fused the public and private
spheres. Before doing this, however, we need to note how one aspect of the
decision might appear to - but in fact does not - contradict our previous
analysis.' This aspect is the High Court's articulation of the concept of the
Crown's radical title.
In Mabo, the High Court stated that the Crown acquired a radical title
to the land over which it acquired sovereignty." This might appear to give
the Crown a (private) property interest that precisely corresponds to its
(public) sovereignty over a territory. Now it is true that at the level of legal
theory, radical title does bring the public and private spheres into interaction
by 'linking ... the constitutional or public law notion of sovereignty on one
hand, and the private law of proprietary rights on the other'.' However, no
doctrinal consequences flow from this linking in respect of the survival of
Indigenous property rights. The Crown's radical title 'is not a real title for
property purposes',' but an incarnation of the Crown's sovereign power to
create private property interests, either in others (by a grant under the
doctrine of tenure) or in itself (by the appropriation of land for Crown
purposes). ' Understood in this way, the radical title of the Crown does not
add to the rights the Crown otherwise has as sovereign.
This is to be contrasted with the position in English land law where the
public sphere of sovereignty and the private sphere of property rights are
not merely linked by the concept of radical title, but are in fact 'coextensive'." The precise correspondence between sovereignty and property
rights in land meant that when the Crown acquired sovereignty over
England, and thus the ownership of all of the land in England, no room was
left for the survival of the pre-existing property rights in land. These rights
were extinguished.'
magistrate held that Mr Yunupingu's native title rights provided him with a
good defence because they were recognised and given effect to by the

36

37
38
39
40
41
42

Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth), as the conduct in
question took place on land held under that Act. The magistrate did not
therefore need to consider whether the native title rights of the accused had
been recognised and given effect to by the common law alone: Levy (1998) p
12. The case does not therefore support the concept of native title affording a
general immunity from the sovereignty of the Crown.
As will be seen below, in demonstrating the consistency between the concept
of radical title and the drawing of a sharp distinction between sovereignty and
property, we draw heavily on Edgeworth (1994).
Mabo at 51-52 per Brennan J; at 81 per Deane and Gaudron JJ; at 122 per
Dawson J; at 180 per TooheyJ.
Edgeworth (1994) p 415. Also see Wik at 186 per Gummow.J.
Wik at 234 per Kirby J.
Mabo at 48 per Brennan J.
Edgeworth (1994) p 415.
See Mabo at 46-47 per Brennan J; and Edgeworth (1994) p 416.
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The concept of radical title as articulated in Mabo is quite different from
the concept under English law. In the Australian context, the concept does
not involve a collapsing of the distinction between sovereignty and
property, and is thus consistent with our analysis of the sharp division
between these notions.
Fusing the public and the private:
A re-feudalisation of Australian land law
We now consider the way in which the Mabo decision does fuse the public
and the private spheres. As we have seen, this phenomenon does not involve
a blurring of sovereignty and property, but rather occurs in the conception
of property itself. The conflation of the public and private spheres in the
common law construct of native title as a form of property interest has
parallels with the conflation of the public and private dimensions of land
ownership in the feudal period. Hence we can say that Mabo also refeudalises Australian land law.
Landholding in the feudal period was dominated by the reciprocal relationship between the lord (who granted an interest in land) and the tenant
(who held the land pursuant to the grant). The ultimate source of all interests in land was the Crown, and all land was held 'mediately or immediately'
of the Crown. In return for holding their estates in the land, and also the
protection the lord was bound to afford them, tenants were obliged to
perform certain services for their lords. These services ranged over the
provision of military, spiritual, civil or agricultural activities" and were
legally enforceable by a lord against a defaulting tenant." It was the
obligation to perform these services which gave feudal landholding its public
aspect. The 'ownership' of land was 'conditional on the owner's
performance of [a] social function'," and thus underpinned a vision of a
proper social ordering. The relationship between political superior and
political inferior had its locus not only in the personal relationship between
individuals, but also in the land itself." In this way, in the feudal period
'"public law" appear[ed] as a mere appendix to "real property law"...'.
Of course, the modern law of freehold tenure is substantially located in
the private sphere. Although the doctrine of tenure still applies in
43

44
45
46

47

Known respectively (and in somewhat simplified form) as knight service,
frankalmoin, serejanty and socage tenure: JH Baker (1990) An Introduction to
English Legal History, 3"dedn, Butterworths, pp 259-60. For a detailed survey of
the various types of feudal services, see F Pollock and FW Mailtand (1968) The
History of English Law, orig 1898, vol 1, Cambridge University Press, pp 23996.
Baker (1990) p 272.
Macpherson (1975) p 109.
See Pollock and Mailtand (1968) pp 230-1, cited in Edgeworth (1994) p 426; and
A E-S Tay and E Kamenka (1993) 'Public Law-Private Law' in SI Benn and GF
Gaus (eds) Publicand Privatein Social Life, Croom Helm, pp 69-70.
Pollock and Mailtand (1968) p 231, cited in Edgeworth (1994) p 426.
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Australia,' it applies in a formal way only. The substance of the tenurial

relationship between lord and tenant has been gutted with the abolition of
the old feudal services and incidents. Land ownership is no longer contingent
upon the performance of some social function, but has become much more
absolute so as to be amenable for distribution through the market
economy." Land ownership is now driven by individual preference and
desire, with ownership being seen as a way of satisfying individual wants.
The Crown as paramount lord and the font of property rights (and hence
located in both the public and private spheres) has, for all practical purposes,
been replaced by the state which both protects and limits property rights
(and which is firmly rooted in the public sphere).
The common law construct of native title differs significantly from this
vision of property rights that substantially inhere in the private sphere.
Native title also inhabits a public sphere in a manner analogous to land
ownership under feudalism. We are not suggesting that the deeply spiritual
relationship between the Indigenous peoples of Australia and their land was
replicated in feudal society.' What we are suggesting is that the conditional
nature of native title under Australian law places native title as a property
interest in the public sphere of subordination to a shared normative framework, rather than in the private realm of the satisfaction of individual (or
group) preferences and desires. Our view is based on this passage in the
judgment of Brennan J:
[W]hen the tide of history has washed away any real acknowledgment
of traditionallaw and any real observance of traditionalcustoms, the

foundation of native title has disappeared. A native title which has

ceased with the abandoning of laws and customs based on tradition
cannot be revived for contemporary recognition. Australian law can
protect the interests of members of an indigenous clan or group,

whether communally or individually, only in conformity with the
traditionallaws and customs of the people to whom the clan or group

belongs and only where members of the clan or group acknowledge

those
laws and observe those customs (so far as is practicable to do
51
so).

48

49
50

As Brennan J said in Mabo. 'It is far too late in the day to contemplate an
allodial or other system of land ownership. Land in Australia which has been
granted by the Crown is held on a tenure of some kind ...' (at 47).
Macpherson (1975) pp 107-8.
On this issue, see Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation (1994) Understanding
Country, Key Issue Paper No 1, Australian Government Publishing Service, pp
1-7; M Dodson (1997) 'Human Rights and the Extinguishment of Native Title'
in E Johnston et al (eds) Indigenous Australiansand the Law, Cavendish, p 159;
H McRae et al (1997) Indigenous Legal Iues: Commentary and Materials, 2"
edn, LBC, pp 87-97; and GD Meyers et al, 'Asking the Minerals Question:
Rights in Minerals as an Incident of Native Title' (1997) 2 Aust Indig L Reporter

203, pp 205-7.
51

Mabo at 60 (emphasis added). It should be noted that in Mabo, Deane and
Gaudron JJ took a slightly different view on this point. Their Honours said:
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The reasoning that the existence of native title is contingent upon the
observance by the Indigenous community, and their ancestors before them,
of their traditional laws and customs was used by Olney J in Yorta Yortd' as
one of the bases for finding that the claimants did not have native title in
that case." His Honour stated that the effect of European settlement in the
Murray area upon the Aboriginal people had been 'devastating'.' Disease,
conflict and forced relocation caused a drastic reduction in the Aboriginal
population," and the 'use of indigenous languages and the observance of
traditional practices' had been suppressed on the Aboriginal mission in the
claim area.' All this amounted to a 'process of disintegration of the
Aborigines' former way of life',' and lead OlneyJ to conclude:
The evidence does not support a finding that the descendants of the
original inhabitants of the claimed land ... have continued to observe
and acknowledge, [since 1788], the traditional laws and customs in
relation to land of their forebears. The facts in this case lead inevitably to the conclusion that before the end of the nineteenth century
the ancestors through whom the claimants claim title had ceased to
occupy their traditional lands in accordance with their traditional
laws and customs. The foundation of the claim to native title in relation to the land previously occupied by those ancestors having
disappeared, the native title rights and interests previously enjoyed
are not capable of revival. This conclusion effectively resolves the
application for a determination of native title.'
The 'tide of history' basis for the expiry of native title was also considered by Lee J in Ward." His Honour said that European settlement in the
It is unnecessary, for the purposes of this case, to consider the question
whether [native title rights] will be lost by the abandonment of traditional
customs and ways. Our present view is that, at least where the relevant
tribe or group continues to occupy or use the land, they will not. (at 110)
52

53

54
55
56
57
58
59

Yorta Yorta. The case involved an application for a determination of native title
under the Native Title Act made on behalf of the Yorta Yorta people in respect
of certain land and waters in the Murray region of northern Victoria and
southern New South Wales.
The other basis was the view expressed by Toohey J in Mabo that native title
would expire on the claimant group ceasing to occupy the relevant land (at
192). See Yorta Yorta at paras 121, 129.
Yorta Yorta at para 63.
Ibid at para 36.
Ibid at para 117.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 129.
Ward at 514-539. The case involved an application for the determination of
native title under the Native Title Act made on behalf of the Miriuwung and
Gajerrong people in respect of certain land and waters in the East Kimberley
region of northern Western Australia and the Northern Territory, an
application on behalf of certain subgroups of the Miriuwung and Gajerrong
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East Kimberley area, the 'conquest' of the Aboriginal people of the region
and the forced relocation of many of them had 'a great impact on the ability
of Aboriginal people to maintain organised communities'.' Many Aborigines were killed by European settlers and miners, and many died from
disease and malnutrition. The introduction of the pastoral industry also had
a profound impact upon traditional Aboriginal life by depriving Aborigines
of their traditional sources of food, making difficult their nomadic way of
life and initiating their relocation to homesteads as a source of labour."
His Honour found that European influences had significantly impacted
upon the way of life of the Aboriginal peoples in the claim area. After
colonisation, the 'quarrying and flaking of stone for spear points all but
disappeared', and the absorption of many Aborigines into the pastoral
industry resulted in a complete reversal of the pattern of Aboriginal activity
between the wet and the dry seasons.' Following European settlement,
certain rules relating to marriage on the basis of subsection membership
'yielded to the influence of surrounding European lifestyle',' and a new
flexibility was adopted in defining sub-group membership on the basis of
choice by children. Further, the relative importance of subgroups declined in
favour of an increased importance upon identity with either the Miriuwung
or Gajerrong communities as a whole."
Yet despite the adverse impact of European settlement upon the culture
of the Aboriginal communities of the East Kimberley, Lee J regarded the
evidence as attesting to 'a community conducted in parallel with European
society organised by adherence to, an observance of, traditional laws and
customs of a prior Aboriginal community'.'5 His Honour found that the
evidence showed that the claimants and their ancestors had fundamentally
maintained the traditional connection with their land which was necessary
to support the continuation of native title."
Archaeological evidence demonstrated a 'continuity of use of particular
areas of land prior to, and after, European colonisation, the latter being
demonstrated by artefacts such as tools or trade items fashioned from
materials introduced by Europeans'.' The study of rock paintings
demonstrated that some sites 'have spiritual and mythological meanings that
have been handed down through the generations'." Additionally, the

60
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64
65
66
67
68

people in respect of the same land and waters and an application on behalf of
the Balangarra peoples in respect of Lacrosse Island, a small island in the waters
claimed by the other applicants.
Ward at 515-16.
Ibid.
Ibidat 515.
Ibid at 536.
Ibid at 540-541.
Ibid at 535.
Ibid at 539.
Ibid at 514.
Ibid.
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'contemporary vitality of ceremonial law and custom'69 is manifested by: the
almost universal use among the claimant groups of Aboriginal as well as
European names; the ceremonial bestowal of special 'narregoo' names
(names of deceased ancestors); the observation of various avoidance and
taboo rules; the performance of initiation and other traditional ceremonies;
the transmission of ritual knowledge and belief - including the
Ngarranggarni stories - from one generation to the next; the naming of
various sites of their land and an acceptance of an obligation care for the land
in accordance with traditional law; the observance of rules relating to
separate men's and women's law; the contemporary use of natural resources
of the land in ceremonies and for tool making; and the knowledge and
employment of the traditional skills of hunting, fishing, gathering and the
production of bush medicines.'
The results reached in the Yorta Yorta and Ward cases demonstrate that
the recognition of native title is contingent upon the continued observance
of a particular (namely 'traditional') way of life. The common law construct
of native title thus takes on a distinctive feudal appearance. Unlike the
property interest constituted by the modern law of freehold tenure, the
property interest constituted by native title does not serve the private sphere
goals of promoting the autonomy and preferences of the holders of the
property right. If it did serve these goals, the claimants in Yorta Yorta should
have succeeded. After all, the claimants were able to prove that at least some
of them were the biological descendants of the inhabitants of the claimed
land at the time of the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty. 7' This meant that
the entity which (potentially) held the property rights had continued - that
is, not ceased - to exist. Yet Yorta Yorta demonstrates that the common law
subordinates the preferences of the (potential) holders of native title by
denying them the freedom to act in relation to the land in the way they
want in the prevailing circumstances. The preferences of Indigenous
communities are therefore subordinated to the public sphere concept of a
higher social purpose or proper social ordering, namely, their observance of
a lifestyle which is sufficiently 'traditional'. The real significance of this, of
course, is that it is the common law, and not the relevant Indigenous
community, which is charged with deciding whether the lifestyle of the
(potential) native title holders warrants the continued recognition of their
property interest.'
In this section, we have seen not only that the common law construct
of native title is inconsistent in its treatment of the public/private distinction, but also that this treatment consistently works to the disadvantage of
the Indigenous peoples of Australia. By dislocating the issues of property
69
70
71
72

Ibid at 538.
Ibid at 535-536, 538.
Yorta Yorta at para 104.
Another potential (and related) limitation is that the use of land by native title
holders other than in accordance with traditional law and custom would not
receive the protection of the common law. This potential aspect of native title
will be analysed below.

HeinOnline -- 8 Griffith L. Rev. 62 1999

GRA TTAN & MCNAMARA: COMMON LAw CONSTRUCT OF NATIVE TITLE

63

ownership and sovereignty, the common law does allow for the existence of
a form of native title. Equally as important, however, is that this dislocation
confines Indigenous aspirations for empowerment to the private sphere of
property ownership and forecloses access to the public sphere of selfdetermination. Yet, the common law imposes restrictions upon the private
sphere options of native titleholders in the enjoyment of their property
rights in a manner which is more akin to public sphere notions of subordination to a perceived proper social ordering.
Static Nature of Native Title/Dynamic Nature of
Common Law Property Rights
In this section, we address the issue of the limitations upon the enjoyment of
native title imposed by the common law. It will be seen that, in addition to
prohibiting the alienation of native title, it is likely that the Australian
title
common law will frequently limit its protection of the uses of nativetitle.71
of the native
land to the uses traditionally carried out by the holders
The static nature of the common law construct of native title in this context
can be contrasted with the freedom which the common law system has
claimed for its own conception of land ownership to change radically over
time." The dialectic between stasis and dynamism has resulted in a conception of native title as a limited and feudal-like property right when seen
against the backdrop of the development of common law freehold tenure
from its feudal origins to the present day.
The static nature of native title: Restrictions on protected use
A number of commentators have argued that the common law construct of
native title does not confine its protection to traditional uses of the land.
Wootten and Pearson argue that the reference by the High Court in Mabo to
the traditional laws and customs of an Indigenous group is only relevant in
determining the rights of the members of the group inter se.- They argue
73

74

75

We say that the common law 'protects' rather than 'permits' certain uses of
native title land for the following reason. To say that the common law permits
certain uses of native title land suggests that if the native title holders engage in
a use of the land which is not so permitted, they have performed an act which
is wrongful (and will thus incur legal liability) even in the absence of some
express legal prohibition. To say that the common law 'protects' certain uses of
the
native title land does not suggest the foregoing. Rather, it suggests that
performance
the
with
interfering
from
party
third
a
prohibit
will
law
common
by the native title holders of a protected use of the land, but that it will not
prohibit the interference with non-protected uses.
We use the term 'common law system' in contradistinction to non-Indigenous
as
law, and we use it in the expansive sense of the body of general law rules
supplemented or altered by statute.
N
H Wootten, 'Mabo: Issues and Challenges' (1994) 1 JudicialR 303, pp 330-8;
Rights
Land
in
Law'
Common
at
Title
Native
of
Concept
Pearson (1996) 'The
- Past, Present and Future: Conference Papers, Northern and Central Land
Councils, p 118.
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that as against non-native titleholders, the communal title of the relevant
group carries something approaching full beneficial title. Standing in the way
of this optimistic view, however, are statements in Mabo which presage that
only traditional uses of land will be protected by the construct of native
title. Brennan J stated:
Native title has its origin in and is given its content by the traditional
laws acknowledged by and the traditional customs observed by the
indigenous inhabitants of a territory. The nature and incidents of
as a matter of fact by reference to
native title must be ascertained
6
those laws and customs.'

In the same vein, Deane and Gaudron

JJ stated:

Since [native] title preserves entitlement to use or enjoyment under
the traditional law or custom of the relevant territory or locality, the
contents of the rights and the identity of those entitled to enjoy them
must be ascertained by reference to that traditional law or custom.-

The issue about the scope of the protected use of native title land is
muddied by statements of Brennan J and Deane and Gaudron JJ about the
potential for the development of the traditional laws or customs which
delimit the content of native title. Their Honours thought that the development of traditional law and custom would not result in an extinguishment
of native title, provided that the essential relationship or connection between
the group and their land remains.-' The precise boundary between the
evolution of tradition, on one hand, and the replacement of it, on the other,
is not clear. 9 Meyers, Piper and Rumley raise the possibility that the
traditional use by Aborigines of various minerals may allow, under the
auspices of native title, the commercial extraction of minerals by modern
technological means.' In Canada, however, the courts have not allowed
much scope within the context of Aboriginal rights for a traditional noncommercial use of land to metamorphose into a traditional commercial
one. "1 A similar tendency can be detected in the Federal Court of Australia in
Yarmirr." In that case, Olney J had little difficulty in finding that the
76
77
78
79
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81
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Maboat 58.
Ibid at 110.
Ibid at 70 per Brennan J; at 110 per Deane and Gaudron JJ. Also see Ward at
538, 539.
RH Bartlett (1993b) 'The Source, Content and Proof of Native Title at
Common Law' in RH Bartlett (ed) Resource Development and AboriginalLand
Rights in Australia, Centre for Commercial and Resources Law, p 45; and RH
Bartlett, 'The Mabo Decision' (1993a) 1 Aust Prop LJ236, p 249 .
Meyers et al (1997) pp 221-31.
See the text accompanying notes 87-90.
The case involved an application for a determination of native title under the
Native Title Act made on behalf of the Mandilarri-Ildugij, Mangalara, Murran,
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traditional laws and customs of the claimants gave rise to native title rights
to 'fish and hunt for the purpose of satisfying their personal, domestic [and]
non-commercial communal needs'." By contrast, his Honour was disposed
to conclude that the traditional laws and customs of the native title holders
did not support native title rights to trade in the resources of the claimed sea
areas. This was despite the fact that there was 'some evidence that in the past
the ancestors of some of the applicants engaged in a form of trade both
amongst themselves and with Macassan trepangers'. ' In the final analysis,
however, his Honour found that there was no evidence 'to suggest that trade
in the resources of the claimed area formed part of the traditional customs of
the applicants' ancestors......
This reluctance of Canadian and Australian courts to find that native
title will allow the use of land for something other than subsistence or
ceremonial purposes might be countered by the recent decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Delgamuukw.' This decision distinguished the
institution of Aboriginal title from the institution of Aboriginal rights, and
outlined the consequences which flow from this distinction. We will
consider this aspect of the decision in some detail, so that its relevance to the
Australian context can be assessed.

The Canadian institution of Aboriginal title
Aboriginal rights are activities which formed, at the time prior to European
contact,' 'an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to the
distinctive aboriginal culture of the aboriginal group claiming the right'.' By
and large, the Canadian courts have construed the content of these rights
narrowly,' so that a traditional practice of fishing for subsistence and ceremonial purposes has been seen as not establishing a Aboriginal right to fish
for commercial purposes.'
By contrast, in Delgamuukw, Lamer CJ described the concept and the
scope of Aboriginal title in this way.

83
84
85
86

87
88
89
90

Gadura, Minaga and Ngaynjaharr peoples in respect of certain sea areas in the
Croker Island region of the Northern Territory.
Yarmirrat 439.
Ibid at 423.
Ibid at 425.
The case involved a claim by hereditary chiefs of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en
peoples, on behalf of themselves individually and their Houses, for Aborignal
title over 58, 000 square kilometres of land in British Columbia.
R v Van der Peet [1996] 2 SCR 507 (hereafter Van der Peet) at 554-555 per
Lamer CJ (La Forest, Gonthier, Cory, Iacobucci and Major JJ concurring).
Ibid at 549.
See J Gray, '0 Canada: Van Der Peet as Guidance on the Construction of
Native Title Rights' (1997) 2 Aust IndigL Reporter 18, pp 33-4.
See, for example, Van der Peet and R v NTC Smokehouse Ltd [1996] 2 SCR 672.
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Aboriginal title is a right in the land and, as such, is more than the
right to engage in specific activities which may themselves be Aboriginal rights. Rather, it confers the right to use land for a variety of
activities, not all of which need be aspects of practices, customs and
traditions which are integral to the distinctive cultures of aboriginal
societies. Those activities do not constitute the right per se, rather,
they are parasitic on the underlying title. However, the range of uses
is subject to the limitation that they must not be irreconcilable with
the nature of the attachment to the land which forms the basis of the
particular group's aboriginal title. This inherent limit ... flows from
the definition of aboriginal title as a suigeneris interest in land, and is
one way in which aboriginal title is distinct from a fee simple."

Aboriginal title carries with it the right to exclusive use and occupation
of the land for a variety of 'non-traditional' purposes. - Mineral rights are
included in Aboriginal title." The uses to which Aboriginal title land may be

put do not include uses which are 'irreconcilable with' or which would
destroy the 'special bond between the group and the land in question'.'
Thus, according to Lamer CJ, Aboriginal title would not allow land traditionally used as a hunting ground to be used for strip mining, nor would it
allow land of ceremonial or cultural significance to be used as a parking lot.95

Clearly, even with the limitation just mentioned, Aboriginal title
permits a wider range of activities than Aboriginal rights. Whereas
Aboriginal rights must be referable to traditional activities, Aboriginal title
has an existence which is logically independent from the various activities
which it protects and which are parasitic upon it. However, in terms of the
requisite connection between a claimant Aboriginal group and particular
land, the requirement for the existence of Aboriginal title is more demanding
than the test for the existence of an Aboriginal right.'
In order to found a claim of Aboriginal title, the group must prove that
it was in exclusive occupation of the land prior to the Crown's acquisition
of sovereignty,9 7 and that it has maintained a substantial connection with the
land since then." However, in determining the question of exclusive
occupation, a court must place equal weight on both the perspectives of the
common law and Aboriginal law and defacto practice." Thus, the common
law's emphasis upon exclusive physical occupation'" is ameliorated by the
Delgamuukw at 1080-1081 per Lamer CJ (Cory, McLachlin and Major JJ
concurring).
92 Ibid at 1083.
93 Ibid at 1086-1087.
94 Ibid at 1083, 1089 respectively.
95 Ibid at 1089.
96 Ibid at 1094-1095, 1106.
97 Ibid at 1097.
98 Ibid at 1102-1103.
99 Ibid at 1099-1101, 1104-1105.
100 Physical occupation can be shown by a range of activities from:
91
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possible role of Aboriginal law in providing an explanation for the presence
of other Aboriginal groups on the land. 1 For example, the law of the
claimant group may explain the presence of another group on the land in a
number of ways. The presence may be regarded as a trespass, or as being
voluntarily consented to, or as permitted by treaty."

The relevance of the Canadian distinction to Australia
We have outlined the distinction drawn by the Canadian courts between the
institutions of Aboriginal title and Aboriginal rights and the concomitant
distinction in the range of land uses protected by these institutions. We now
need to examine the relevance of this learning to the issue of the range of
uses protected by the common law construct of native title in the Australian
context.
Although none of the Australian cases have squarely considered the
relevance to Australian law of the Canadian distinction between Aboriginal
title and Aboriginal rights, the case which comes closest to doing so is Ward.
In that case, a number of aspects of Lee J's judgment clearly show that his
Honour regarded native title as it exists in Australian law under the Native
Title Act as conforming more closely to the Canadian institution of Aboriginal title rather than the institution of Aboriginal rights.0"
First, after considering the distinction between Aboriginal title and
Aboriginal rights in the Canadian cases, Lee J described native title by
adopting the language Lamer CJ used in Delgamuukw to describe the instithe construction of dwellings through cultivation and enclosure of fields to
regular use of definite tracts of land for hunting, fishing or otherwise
exploiting its resources ... [assessed in light of] the group's size, manner of
life, material resources, and technological abilities, and the character of the
lands claimed. (ibid at 1101, reference omitted)
101 Ibid at 1104-1105.
102 Ibid at 1105.
103 Indeed, Ward may be read as positing native title as a form of land ownership
which is relatively more favourable to Indigenous people than the Canadian
institution of Aboriginal title. First, although Lee J did refer (at 505) to the
caveat of Lamer CJ that Aboriginal title does not protect non-traditional uses
of land which are incompatible with the special on-going bond between
Indigenous peoples and their land (see text accompanying notes 91-95), Lee J
did not include this caveat in his description (at 639-640, 645) of the nature and
extent of the claimants' native title. Secondly, unlike Lamer J in relation to
Aboriginal title (see text accompanying notes 97-102), Lee J did not expressly
state that the wide range of uses permitted by native title was contingent upon
the exclusive occupancy of the land by the ancestors of the claimant group.
According to LeeJ:
At common law, native title in land will exist at the date of sovereignty if
an [I]ndigenous community had an entitlement to use or occupy the land at
that time, that entitlement arising from local recognition that the presence
of the community on the land reflected a particular relationship, or
connection, between that community and the land. (at 500, emphasis added,
reference omitted)
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tution of Aboriginal title. According. to Lee J, native title is not a 'mere
"bundle of rights"', but rather a 'communal "right to the land"' which gives
rise to rights which are 'parasitic' upon native title.'"
Secondly, Lee J contradistinguished native title from a "'freestanding"
usufructuary right' of Aboriginal persons which might potentially exist
under Australian law.' 5 The use of the term 'free-standing' is reminiscent of
the Canadian concept of Aboriginal rights which are independent from, and
not 'parasitic' upon, an underlying Aboriginal title.'0' Thus, Lee J saw native
title as being very different from a right analogous to the Canadian
institution of Aboriginal rights.
Finally, Lee J gave the claimants' native title a content which is at least
as wide as that afforded to the holders of Aboriginal title under Canadian
law.1" Lee J determined that except where the claimants' native title had been
extinguished, and subject to its co-existence with interests created by the
Crown, the claimants were entitled, inter alia, to: 'possess, occupy, use and
enjoy'; 'make decisions about the use and enjoyment' of; 'control the access
of others' to; 'use and enjoy [the] resources' of; 'control the use and
enjoyment of others of [the] resources' of ; and 'trade in [the] resources' of,
the claimed land."0 In so doing, Lee J did not limit these entitlements to
104 Ward at 508. See the passage from the judgment of Lamer CJ quoted in the text
accompanying note 91.
105 Ward at 615. His Honour claimed that such a right was asserted - ultimately
unsuccessfully - by the respondent in Eaton v Yanner; Ex parte Eaton
(unreported, Court of Appeal (Qld), 27 February 1998). With respect, this
appears to be an inaccurate characterisation of the form of legal recognition of
Aboriginal hunting rights for which Yanner argued before the Queensland
Court of Appeal. Yanner argued that he had a native title right to hunt
crocodiles on his traditional lands and waterways, not an independent or
'freestanding' Aboriginal right. The Court of Appeal did consider, as an
alternative to native title recognition, that Yanner's claimed right to hunt could
be characterised as a common law right to hunt. However, the latter is a right
which arises at common law by virtue of the claimant's status as an owner or
occupier of the land in question; it is not a distinctive Aboriginal right. By
majority (McPherson JA and Moynihan J), the Court of Appeal ruled that the
native title hunting right claimed by Yanner had been extinguished in 1974 by
amendments to the Fauna Conservation Act 1954 (Qld) which removed a
statutory exemption from the s 54(1)(a) prohibition on the killing and taking of
native animals previously applied to Aborigines and which purported to vest in
the Crown ownership of all fauna covered by the Act (s7). Fitzgerald P
dissented, ruling that the 1974 amendments regulated but did not extinguish
native title hunting rights. Yanner has been granted special leave to appeal by
the High Court of Australia.
The existence of an Aboriginal right to hunt in Australian law, independent of
native title, has been postulated by D Sweeney, 'Fishing, Hunting and
Gathering Rights of Aboriginal Peoples in Australia' (1993) 16(1) UNSWLJ97,
but apart from the comments of Lee J in Ward, there is no firm judicial
authority for this proposition.
106 See text accompanying notes 87-91.
107 See the first paragraph of note 103.
108 Ward at 639, see also at 645 (there is a slight difference in wording between the
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those practices which were encompassed by the traditional laws and customs
of the claimants. This stands in sharp contrast to the uses protected under
the Canadian institution of Aboriginal rights." According to Lee J, the
native title holders are entitled to engage in these uses of the claimed land,
'by reason of the existence of native title'."' This language is again consistent
with the notion of protected uses being parasitic upon the institution of
native title which is logically prior to the various uses of the land which it
protects.
Thus, Ward supports the view that the common law construct of native
title in Australia can protect a wide range of non-traditional uses of land in
the same way that these uses are protected by the Canadian institution of
Aboriginal title. It does so both directly, in terms of the wide range of
protected uses which Lee J expressly sets out in describing the nature and
incidents of native title,"' as well as indirectly, by describing native title in
terms analogous to Aboriginal title and inconsistent with Aboriginal
rights."Of course, Ward is a first instance decision of the Federal Court. Let us
examine how the Canadian distinction between Aboriginal title and
Aboriginal rights aligns with what can be extracted from the High Court's
statements about the content of the common law construct of native title.
The reference in Mabo to the content and incidents of native title as
being determined by the traditional law and custom of the particular
Indigenous group"' appears to parallel the Canadian conception of Aboriginal rights as protecting the performance of a series of separately identifiable
traditionally-based activities."' Similarly, in the High Court case of Fejo,
Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ, by way
of obiter dicta, referred to 'rights which together constitute native title',"
and then went on to explain:
[t]he rights of native title are rights and interests that relate to the use
of the land by the holders of native title. For present purposes let it be
assumed that those rights may encompass a right to hunt, to gather or
to fish, a right to conduct ceremonies on the land, a right to maintain

the land in a particular state or other like rights and interests."'

Determination and the Order of Lee J).

109 See text accompanying notes 87-90.
110 Ward at 645; see also at 639.

111
112
113
114
115

See text accompanying note 108.
See text accompanying notes 104-106.
See the text accompanying notes 76-77.
See the text accompanying notes 87-90.
Fejo at 737.

116 Ibid (emphasis added); also see at 757 per KirbyJ-
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This description of native title appears to be inconsistent with the
Canadian conception of Aboriginal title as a right in land which is logically
prior to, and in fact supports, a wide range of traditional and non-traditional
land uses. Like the statement in Mabo just referred to, it suggests that native
title in Australia conforms to the Canadian institution of Aboriginal rights.
This, of course, raises the possibility that the Australian courts may tightly
limit the uses of land protected by native title to those uses traditionally
carried out on the land, in the same way that the Canadian courts have done
with Aboriginal rights.
Bearing in mind the foregoing analysis, there is also some support in the
High Court's consideration of the nature of native title for the proposition
that in Australian law native title conforms to the Canadian institution of
Aboriginal title. In the judgment of Brennan J in Mabo, sitting side by side
with the references to traditional law and custom determining the content of
native title are references to the importance of exclusive possession of the
claimant Indigenous group. A prominent example of this is the statement of
Brennan J that:
[i]f it be necessary to categorise an interest in land as proprietary in
order that it survive a change in sovereignty, the interest possessed by
a community that is in exclusive possession of land falls into that
category. Whether or not land is owned by individual members of a
community, a community which asserts and asserts effectively that
none but its members has any right to occupy or use the land has an
interest in the land that must be proprietary in nature: there is no
other proprietor.... The ownership of land within a territory in the
exclusive occupation of a people must be vested in that people: land is
susceptible of ownership, and there are no other owners.17
As conceptualised in this passage, native title bears an extremely close
resemblance to Aboriginal title as represented in Delgamuukw. Both are
regarded as a communal interest in land based on the exclusive occupancy of
an Indigenous group. This being so, strong arguments can be made for the
same width of potential uses allowed under Canadian Aboriginal title also
being allowed under Australian native title founded upon an Indigenous
group's exclusive possession. The Order made in the Mabo case supports this
view. The High Court declared that in respect of the lands over which their
native title subsisted, the Meriam people were 'entitled as against the whole
world to the possession [and] occupation', as well as the 'use and enjoyment' of
those lands."' The coincidence of the concepts of exclusive possession and
unqualified use and enjoyment is certainly consistent with the Canadian
learning on Aboriginal title.
It may be, then, that in the Australian context, the common law
construct of native title is not singly wedded to either Aboriginal title or
Aboriginal rights as these concepts have been defined in the Canadian case
117 Maboat 51.
118 Ibid at 217 (emphasis added).
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law. Rather, the High Court may be seen as having laid the foundations for
conceptualising native title as encompassing both Aboriginal title and Aboriginal rights, with the content given to it depending upon the particular
circumstances of the individual case. Thus, where the relevant Indigenous
group was in exclusive possession of the relevant land at the time of the
acquisition of sovereignty, the form of native title which may be constructed
by the common law will conform to Aboriginal title, and a wide range of
traditional and non-traditional uses of the land will be protected. By
contrast, where the relevant Indigenous group was not in exclusive
possession of the relevant land at the time of the acquisition of sovereignty,
then the form of native title constructed will conform to Aboriginal rights,
and only certain traditional uses of the land will be protected.
It must be noted, however, that even if the common law construct of
native title does have this compendious nature, there may be little scope for
successful native title claims in Australia based upon exclusive possession if
the Australian courts as a whole adopt the approach taken by Olney J in
Yarmirr, rather than that taken by Lamer CJ in Delgamuukw. We have seen
perspective on
that Lamer CJ gave a prominent role to 'the [A]boriginal
119
land' in determining the question of exclusive possession. Two aspects of
the judgment of Olney J in Yarmirr indicate that his Honour placed very
little emphasis on Aboriginal conceptions of relationships with land.
First, and at a general level, his Honour rejected the relevance of the fact
that under the traditional law of the claimants, the claimed area was their
'country'. Instead, his Honour found that the claimants' native title rights
had to be determined by reference to the Western view of property as a
bundle of individual, ascertainable rights.'"
Secondly, and at a more specific level, Olney J used particularities of the
claimants' traditional law in a negative way so as to deny their claim of the
exclusivity of their interest. On the question of whether the claimants and
their ancestors had exclusive possession of the claimed area, Olney J found
that under their traditional law, the claimants' right to exclude was limited
to other Aborigines, and did not apply to non-Aborigines who generally had
'
no understanding of Aboriginal law. His Honour fastened onto this fact to
deny the claim of exclusivity. Unlike Lamer CJ in Delgamuukw,'" Olney J
did not consider whether it was appropriate to defer to an explanation
provided by the claimants' law for the presence of others on the land.
These two facets of the judgment of Olney J place a premium on
Western notions of exclusivity rather than on Aboriginal conceptions of
119 See the text accompanying notes 99-102. In Ward at 500-501 Lee J advocated a
similar approach with regard to the existence of native title.
120 Yarmirr at 414. For examples of a detailed articulation of the view of property
as a bundle of rights, see WN Hohfeld (1919) FundamentalLegal Conceptions As
Applied in Judicial Reasoning ed WW Cook, Yale University Press; and AM
Honore (1961) 'Ownership' in AG Guest (ed) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence,
Clarendon Press.
121 Yarmirr at 422.
122 See the text accompanying note 119.
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ownership. Thus, if the approach taken by Olney J in Yarmirr is applied,
there seems little scope for the success of native title claims based upon
exclusivity of possession. This suggests that successful native title claims will
fall (to the extent that the Canadian dichotomy is relevant) within the
Aboriginal rights basket, rather than the Aboriginal title basket. Thus, (again
to the extent that the Canadian learning is relevant to the Australian
context), native title usually would permit, at most, only traditional uses of
the relevant land.' 3

The static nature of native title. Prohibition on alienation
We have considered the complex question as to the range of protected uses
that may be carried out upon native title land. However, one restriction
upon native title that is clearly beyond doubt is that it cannot be alienated. 4
The rationale given for this prohibition by Brennan J is that the right to
alienation is not present under the traditional law and custom from which
native title is derived." The right to alienate is, of course, a key element in
the bundle of common law property rights. 6

The static nature of Native Title: Concluding remarks
The two features of native title we have identified - the reduced range of
protected uses and the lack of alienability - both allegedly have their source
in the content of native title holders' traditional law and custom. What this
completely ignores, however, is the that:
Aboriginal peoples have laws, traditions, customs and practices which
have developed, grown, changed - and have been invented - as
Aboriginal people have struggled for physical and cultural survival
[following European colonisation]."
And if the purpose of the common law's recognition of native title is to
secure the physical and cultural survival of Indigenous people, then to hold
that only the subsistence and ceremonial uses of land carried out prior to
colonisation is compatible with Aboriginal tradition completely subverts
that teleology. Borrows and Rotman argue that any contemporary Aboriginal practice - such as the commercial sale of fish - which has been
123 We say 'at most' because of the possibility of even traditional uses being denied
to native title holders on the basis that their native title has been partially
extinguished by, for example, the grant by the Crown of an inconsistent
interest in the land. This issue is considered below.
124 Mabo at 59-60 per Brennan J; at 110 per Deane and Gaudron JJ; Ward at 500.
125 Mabo at 59.
126 In Milrrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141, one of the reasons given by
Blackburn J for the common law not recognising Indigenous property rights
was that these rights were not alienable.
127 J Borrows and LI Rotman, 'The Sui GenerisNature of Aboriginal Rights: Does
it Make a Difference?' (1997) 36 Alberta LR 9, p 36.
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adopted to fulfil a cultural and physical need brought about by colonisation
should receive recognition and protection by the common law, regardless of
the length of time the practice has been recognised.'"
The dynamic nature of common law property rights
We find the above argument against a restricted range of permitted uses of
native title land persuasive. We now assert our own, complementary argument: in denying Indigenous legal systems the capacity to develop so as to
overcome restrictions on use and alienation, the courts have ignored the way
in which common law property rights in land have themselves radically
changed over time. For our purposes, we will focus upon the transformation
of the ownership of land from a method underpinning the political
allegiance of a particular tenant to a particular lord, to a means of exploiting
a resource for the satisfaction of personal desires and preferences.
The first aspect of this transformation relates to the dramatic increase in
the alienability of land brought about by the enactment of the Statute of
Quia Emptores in 1290. At common law, the tenurial nature of land ownership provided a fetter upon the alienation of land. An interest in land could
not be transferred (in feudal parlance, 'substituted') so as to break the
tenurial relationship between the transferor tenant and their lord without
the consent of that lord. It was possible for a tenant to 'subinfeudate' their
interest in the land, thus creating a tenurual relationship between the grantor
tenant and the grantee, but leaving the grantor tenant's relationship with
their lord intact.' 9
The enactment of Quia Emptores altered this position by allowing (with
some minor exceptions) the transfer of land by substitution without the
need for the lord's consent. The transferee tenant would then hold the land
directly from the lord of the transferor tenant. The transferor tenant would
no longer hold an interest in the land and thus would no longer be in a
tenurial relationship with their former lord."3 Quia Emptores thus worked a
major reform in the history of land law."'
The second aspect of the transformation of the common law vision of
land ownership is the metamorphosis of land ownership from a contingent
(and public) to a non-contingent (and private) phenomenon. We noted
128 Ibid at 41. Janice Gray makes a similar point in noting the contrary messages
which the Canadian jurisprudence on Aboriginal rights sends to the Indigenous
peoples of Canada. They are expected to (i) live within a wider society whose
economic and social structure has been profoundly shaped by Euopean
colonisation, yet (ii) not modify their own traditions and practices (at least if
they want their 'Aboriginal rights' with regard to land recognised by the

common law) in response to this colonisation: Gray (1997) p 33.
129 P Butt (1996) Land Law, 3r' edn, LBC, para 415.
130 Ibid, paras 415-16. Also see Baker (1990) pp 273-4. The substance of Quia
Emptores has been preserved in New South Wales in the Imperial Acts
Application Act 1969 (NSW) s 36. See Butt (1996) para 421.
131 It has been described as a 'pillar of [modern] English real property law': RP
Meagher et al (1984) Equity: Doctrinesand Remedies, 2ndedn, Butterworths, p xi.
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above how, in the feudal era, property rights in land were contingent upon
the performance of varying types of services by the tenant to the lord."
Over time, the various types of tenure were rationalised, and the required
services were commuted to a money payment, which itself was eventually
abolished. A major landmark in this process was the enactment of the
Tenures Abolition Act in 1660, which converted all tenures into socage tenure
and abolished most feudal incidents. "3 As a result of these reforms, the
ownership of land is no longer contingent upon the performance of an
obligation owed to the Crown in its capacity of the ultimate 'owner' of the
land.
Stasis, dynamism and the re-feudalisation of
Australian land law
This brief treatment of several centuries of land law shows that the feudal
notion of land as cementing the very personal nature of the tenurial relationship between a particular lord and a particular tenant has been
completely displaced at the level of legal doctrine. The ownership of land is
now seen as a means of satisfying private desires and preferences. The attitude of the common law with regard to native title can therefore be seen as
hypocritical. The common law has denied Indigenous law and custom the
same capacity for development that it has appropriated to itself. The
common law has left the Indigenous people of Australia with a property
interest which, because of its limited nature (in terms of protected use and
alienability), can be described as feudal-like. Such an interest is one which the
common law has long since abandoned for its own purposes.
Native Title and the Common Law Vision of Property:
Transcendence and Enslavement
In this section, we examine how the common law construct of native title
exhibits the dialectic of transcendence and enslavement in the context of the
common law's own vision of how property exists. After this examination,
we will then note how the ability of native title to co-exist with other
property interests is reminiscent of the feudal paradigm of land ownership,
rather than the contemporary one of exclusivity.
Native title and the transcendence of the common law
Native title, as constructed by the common law, transcends the common
law's own vision of property in a number of ways.' Most obviously, native
132 See notes 43-44 and the text accompanying them.
133 See Butt (1996) paras 418-24, esp paras 420-1. The substance of the Tenures
Abolition Act 1600 (Eng) has been preserved in New South Wales by the
Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 (NSW) s 37.
134 In fact, in Mabo only Brennan J was prepared to call native title 'property' (at
51-52). Deane and Gaudron JJ said that native title was personal only and did
not constitute an interest in land (at 88-89); although elsewhere in their
judgments their Honours made statements to the effect that native title was
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title is not derived from a Crown grant... and exists outside the common law
doctrines of tenure and estates."M Additionally, although native title may be
analogous to common law interests such as the fee simple, profit d prendre
and easement,"v the existence and content of native title are not determined
by the common law rules relating to the validity of, or rights attaching to,
these common law interests." Rather, the existence and content of native
title derive from, first, the traditional customs and laws of the relevant
Indigenous group "9 and secondly, special common law rules relating specifically to the non-recognition and extinguishment of native title." This means
that native title can encompass rights and interests which have no parallel in
the common law of real property. In both Yarmirr and Ward, for example,
the respective sets of native title rights were held to include the right to
safeguard cultural and spiritual knowledge.'" Indeed, in contrast to the
position taken by Blackburn J in Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd,"' the majority
in Mabo was keen to point out that the dissimilarity between Aboriginal and
common law proprietary interests was no obstacle to the latter recognising
the former.'
Another example of the transcending aspect of native title is its
communal nature." Although native title rights which are proprietary can
be held by individuals, usually the native title rights of individuals are

135
136

137

138
139
140
141
142

143
144

proprietary: see the passages referred to in K McNeil, 'Racial Discrimination
and Unilateral Extinguishment of Native Title' (1996) 1 Aust Indig L Reporter
181, p 207, n 182. Toohey J described the debate as to whether native title was
personal or proprietary as 'fruitless' (Mabo at 195). For an analysis of the
consequences arising out of a characterisation of native title as property, see
RH Bartlett, 'The Proprietary Nature of Native Title' (1998b) 6 Aust Prop LJ
77.
Mabo at 64 per BrennanJ.
As Brennan J stated in Mabo (at 59): 'Native title, though recognised by the
common law, is not an institution of the common law...'. Also see Fejo at 737
per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and CallinanJJ.
See GD Meyers (1994) 'Aboriginal Rights to the "Profits of the Land": The
Inclusion of Traditional Hunting and Fishing Rights in the Content of Native
Title' in R Bartlett and GD Meyers (eds) Native Title Legislation in Australia,
Centre for Commercial and Resources Law, pp 222-3; and Meyers et al (1997)
pp 120-1.
Ward at 498.
Mabo at 58 per Brennan J.
See McNamara and Grattan (forthcoming).
Yarmirrat426-427, 439; Ward at 640, 645.
(1971) 17 FLR 141. In that case, his Honour relied upon the marked differences
between Indigenous relationships with land and common law concept of
property to deny recognition of native title under the common law (at 272273).
Mabo at 49-52 per Brennan J; at 83-86 per Deane and Gaudron JJ; at 187 per
TooheyJ.
Ibid at 51-52 per BrennanJ; at 109-110 per Deane and GaudronJJ; at 178-179
per Toohey J .
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usufructuary, and rely for their existence upon an underlying communal
title held by the relevant Indigenous group. ' Although the concept of a
communal title - in the inter-generational sense rather than co-ownership
among individuals by joint tenancy or tenancy in common - is not
unknown to the common law, it exists only in very limited circumstances. '
The rules against perpetuities and non-charitable purpose trusts are common
law doctrines which have been used to strike down attempts to create
communal property interests. 11
The enslavement of Native Title by the common law
Having examined the way in which the common law construct of native
title transcends the common law's own vision of property, we now look at
the way in which it is enslaved by that vision. We will see that a fundamental way in which the construct of native title is subordinated to the common
law's concept of property is the susceptibility of native title to complete or
partial extinguishment by inconsistent common law property interests."
There are numerous examples of this phenomenon of extinguishment
in the Australian native title jurisprudence. In Feo, the High Court held that
the grant of a fee simple by the Crown completely and permanently
extinguished all native title rights which may have existed in the relevant
land, even though the land may have subsequently become vacant Crown
land through resumption.149 In Mabo, because of the possibility of extinM

145 Ibid at 51-52 per Brennan J; Mason v Tritton (1994) 34 NSWLR 572 at 582 per
Kirby P.
146 In Wik, GummowJ said:
there is no particular reason to be drawn from English land law which
renders it anomalous to accommodate in Australian land law notions of
communal title which confer usufructuary rights. There are recognised in
England rights of commons which depend for their establishment upon
prescription and custom. An example is the common of pasture in gross
enforceable by action by one commoner on behalf of that commoner and
the other commoners. (at 177, reference omitted)
147 See, for example, Leahy v Attorney-Generalfor New South Wales [1959] AC 457
(purported gift to an unincorporated religious order); and Bacon v Pianta(1966)
114 CLR 634 (purported gift to an unincorporated political party).
148 Mabo at 63-64 per Brennan J; at 89-90 per Deane and Gaudron JJ. Of course,
the position has now been affected by the Native Title Act. Part 2, Division 2B
of the Act - inserted by the Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth) confirms the complete or partial extinguishment of native title by certain acts
done on or before 23 December 1996 which constitute either a 'previous
exclusive possession act' (as defined in s 23B) or a 'previous non-exclusive
possession act' (as defined in s 23F), respectively. In Ward, Lee J said that this
statutory regime 'purports to confirm the operation of the common law' (at
635). Part 2, Division 3 of the Act provides a level of protection for native title
against complete or partial extinguishment from 1 January 1994 (or
exceptionally from some other date) by the regulating the doing of a 'future
act'(as defined in s 233).
149 Fejo at 736 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and
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guishment, the High Court expressly framed its declaration regarding the
existence of native title to exclude land subject of leases granted by the
Crown.'" In Wie, a High Court, although divided on certain issues, was
unanimous in respect of the position where the Crown grants an interest
(such as a pastoral lease) which is wholly or partly inconsistent with native
title. All of their Honours agreed that the rights under a Crown grant take
effect according to their tenor, and that native title is extinguished to the
extent of the inconsistency."' In Yarmirr, Olney J held that the claimants'
native title rights in the minerals in the seabed and subsoil of the claimed
area had been extinguished by legislation which vested the title to such
minerals in the Crown.'5' Further, the claimants' native title rights had to
'yield' to the rights of the lessee under a statutory lease granted by the
Northern Territory for the purpose of commercial pearl culture."' In Ward,
Lee J held that the claimants' native title rights were 'concurrent' with a
plethora of interests granted by the Crown in the claimed land, and that the
claimants' native title 'may be regulated, controlled, curtailed, restricted,
suspended or postponed', by virtue of 'the nature and extent' of those interests granted by the Crown."
The enslavement of the common law construct of native title by the
common law's vision of property rights is further demonstrated by the test
for the extinguishment of native title employed by the High Court. This
test, which we will discuss shortly,' adopts the common law's method for
demarcating property rights on the basis of the underlying rights, rather
than the mode of use actually carried out pursuant to those rights.
The importance of the legal inconsistency of competing rights, rather
than the possibility of the physical co-existence of competing modes of use,
to the common law vision of property can be seen with regard to airspace
trespass. In LPJ Investments Pty Ltd v Howard Chia Investments Pty Ltd (No

2), Hodson J enunciated the following rule for determining whether an
incursion by one land owner into the airspace above the land of another is
actionable.

150
151

152
153
154
155

Callinan JJ; at 756 per Kirby J. The common law position has been confirmed
by the Native Title Acts 237A.
Mabo at 217.
Wik at 85 per Brennan CJ (Dawson and McHugh JJ concurring); at 132-133
per Toohey J (Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ concurring on this point). See
RH Bartlett, 'The Fundamental Significance of Wik v State of Queensland in the
High Court of Australia' [1997a] 2 Can Native L Reporter 1, pp 3-8; K McNeil,
'Co-existence of Indigenous Rights and Other Interests in Land in Australia
and Canada' [1997] 3 Can Native L Reporter 1, pp 1-6; and S Dorsett, '"Clear
and Plain Intention": Extinguishment of Native Title in Australia and Canada
post- Wik' (1997) 6 Griffith LR 96, pp 110-17.
Yarmirrat437-438.
Ibid at 438.
Ward at 640.
See the text accompanying notes 157-162.
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I think the relevant test is not whether the incursion actually interferes with the occupier's actual use of the land at the time, but rather
whether it is of a nature and at a height which may interfere with the
ordinary uses of the land which the occupier may see fit to
undertake. "

This test seeks to demarcate a landowner's interest in the airspace above
their land to a height which they can reasonably use. Once this has been
done, then the right of the landowner to the exclusive enjoyment within the
allocated space is enough to legally displace the appropriation of that space
by other landowners. The fact that the airspace could be physically used by
both is irrelevant. The allocation of legal rights carries the day.
That the same approach applies to the issue of the extinguishment of
the common law construct of native title by an interest granted by the
Crown to a third party, has been made clear by the High Court. In Wic,
although the High Court was divided on the question of the exact rights
which had been granted under the relevant pastoral leases," a majority of
their Honours agreed that native title is extinguished (to the extent of the
inconsistency) when the rights granted by the Crown to a third party are
inconsistent with the rights of the native title holders." This approach was
156 (1989) 24 NSWLR 490 at 495 (original emphasis).
157 See the text accompanying note 167.
158 Wik at 85-88 per Brennan CJ (Dawson and McHugh JJ concurring); at 126 per
TooheyJ; at 233-238 per KirbyJ. In Wik at 166-167 per Gaudron J, and at 203
per Gummow J, and in the judgment of Lee J in Ward at 618, their Honours
made statements to the effect that, in some circumstances, native title is
extinguished by the exercise of the rights of the third party grantee (in
satisfying conditions contained in the grant), rather than the grant of the rights
themselves. These statements do not undercut the legal inconsistency test.
Their Honours were considering the situations of the grant of pastoral leases
which did not carry the right to exclusive possession. Native title, therefore,
had not been completely extinguished. What their Honours were thus dealing
with was a case of partial extinguishment of native title, where generally it will
only be possible to determine how the rights of the native title holder and the
rights of the third party grantee co-exist once the content of both sets of rights
are known. Their Honours' statements only go as far as saying that it is
possible to say, a priorithat whatever the content of the rights of the native
title holders may be, those rights are extinguished over those parts of the land
which have undergone significant physical development. In this way, factual
inconsistency is not a substitute for legal inconsistency, but operates
cumulatively with it.
It should be noted that in adopting the legal inconsistency test, the High Court
has rejected a course taken by various Canadian courts in finding that native
title had not been extinguished it could factually co-exist with the actual land
use carried out under a Crown grant. (In Pejo at 739 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron,
McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ; at 754-756 per Kirby J, the High
Court admitted that it has taken an approach to extinguishment which is
different from that taken in other jurisdictions.) For a consideration of the
various possible approaches to the extinguishment of the common law
construct of native title, see Bartlett (1997a); McNeil (1997); and Dorsett (1997).
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"
unanimously approved by the High Court in Fejo. The judgments of
Brennan CJ and Kirby J in Wik most clearly articulate the test for extinguishment of the common law construct of native title and the justification
for it. Brennan CJ said:

The law can attribute priority to one right over another, but it
cannot recognise the co-existence in different hands of two rights that
cannot both be exercised at the same time. To postulate a test of
inconsistency not between the rights but between the manner of their
exercise would be to deny the law's capacity to determine the priority
of rights over or in respect of the same parcel of land.... To postulate
extinguishment of native title as dependent on the exercise of the
private right of the lessee (rather than on the creation or existence of
the private right) would produce situations of uncertainty, perhaps of
conflict. The question of extinguishment of native title by a grant of
inconsistent rights is - and must be - resolved as a matter of law,
not of fact. If the rights conferred on the lessee of a pastoral lease are,
at the moment when those rights are conferred, inconsistent with a
°
continued right to enjoy native title, native title is extinguished."
Kirby J similarly rejected the view that the grant by the Crown of a
third party interest would not affect the continuation of native title
provided that the third party grantee did not exercise its rights in a manner
inconsistent with the enjoyment of native title. His Honour said that to use
the factual co-existence test would be to 'introduce a dangerous uncertaintyin
the entitlements to all people in Australia .. '.' His Honour then adopted
the inconsistency of incidence test.
The search must ... be one which is first directed at the legal rights
which are conferred on a landholder by the Australian legal system.
This is because legal title and its incidents should be ascertainablebefore
the rights conferred are actually exercised and indeed whether they are
exercised or not. In some cases the grant of such legal rights will have
the inevitable consequence of excluding any competing legal rights,
such as to native title. But in other cases, although the native title
may be impaired, it may not be extinguished. The answer is to be
found in the character of the legal rights, not in the manner of their
exercise. 2
Both Brennan CJ and Kirby J justified their adoption of the test for
extinguishment based upon legal, as opposed to factual, inconsistency upon
the basis that this test would be more conducive to certainty. The exclusiveness of property rights and the perceived certainty that this brings is, of
159 Fejo at 736-737 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and
CallinanJJ; at 759 per Kirby J.
160 Wik at 87 (emphasis added, references omitted).
161 Ibid at 238 (emphasis added).
162 Ibid (emphasis added, reference omitted).
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course, essential to the ideology of market-derived efficiency." Property
rights need to be clearly defined so that they can move to more efficient uses
through private exchange.M
We should note, however, that it is only the party who derives their
interest from the Crown grant who can benefit from the certainty derived
from this approach. While that party's rights are expanded under the test,
the rights of the native titleholders are contracted. Additionally, if it is
permissible to translate the appeal by Brennan CJ and Kirby J to the ideal of
certainty into the paradigm of efficient use through private exchange, 6 ' then
it appears that the common law construct of native title does not fit within
the framework. This is because, unlike the interest of the Crown grantee, the
interests of the native titleholders are not tradeable because of the
prohibition on their alienation. '"
What we have so far seen about the susceptibility of the common law
construct of native title to extinguishment shows its subordination to the
common law's own vision of property rights. Native title must give way to
an interest derived under a Crown grant (rather than the converse). The
focus of the test for extinguishment is upon inconsistent rights, rather than
inconsistent modes of use. The rationale for the extinguishment test is based
upon a paradigm into which native title does not comfortably fit. All this
suggests a framework which assumes a property law universe populated by
interests derived from Crown grants, with the interests derived from native
title existing at the margins as anomalies.

Partial extinguishment, co-existence and a
re-feudalisation ofAustralian land law
Cutting across this enslavement of the common law construct of native title
to the common law's vision of property is the concept which emerges from
Wik of partial extinguishment. This concept arose out of the majority's
finding that the statutory pastoral leases in the case, unlike common law
leases, did not confer exclusive possession on the lessees. This meant that
although the rights of the native titleholders were affected to the extent of
any (legal) inconsistency, they were not extinguished altogether." The
approach of legal co-existence was also adopted by Olney J in Yarmirr,
where his Honour held that the rights of native title holders over sea areas
163 Macpherson (1975) pp 109-10.
164 See R Posner (1986) Economic Analysis of Law, 3'd edn, Little Brown, pp 30-3; R
edn, Addison-Wesley, pp 72Cooter and T Ulen (1997) Law and Economics, 2nd
84.
165 In Fejo, Kirby J expressly justified the adoption of the legal inconsistency test
by reference to a number of societal needs, including 'economic investment and
prosperity' (at 756).
166 See the text accompanying notes 124-126.
167 Wikat 115-122 (esp at 122), 131, 132 per TooheyJ; at 149-156 (esp at 155), 164167 per Gaudron J; 174-177, 194-203 (esp at 201) per Gummow J; at 242-251
(esp at 250-251) per Kirby J. Cf the dissenting view of Brennan C (Dawson
and McHugh JJ agreeing) at 83-84, 88.
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could co-exist with, and were not totally extinguished by, a Crown lease for
pearl culture." The co-existence approach found great expression in Ward,
where Lee J stated that '[fjundamental inconsistency' was required between
native title rights and the rights granted to a third party by the Crown
before native title was totally extinguished.' After reviewing a great number
of interests granted by the Crown, including pastoral leases, mining
tenements and special purposes leases for tourism, jetty and boat-launching
facilities, and for an Aboriginal hostel and intercultural centre, his Honour
found that the grant of none of these interests completely extinguished
native title. The interests of the grantee and of the native titleholders could
thus co-exist.171
The right to exclusive possession usually plays a central role in the
common law vision of property rights.'' Exclusive possession provides the
distinction between 'ownership' and 'non-ownership' interests in land. Of
course, the doctrine of tenure means that there can strictly be no private
(that is, non-Crown) ownership of land, but freehold estates clearly
approximate to this ideal."-" It is the concept of exclusive possession clothed in the enigmatic term 'seisin' - which demarcates freehold estates
easements.':7
as
such
interests
from non-ownership
The preparedness of the majority in Wi/, of Olney J in Yarmirr and of
Lee J in Ward to find that the interests which derived from a Crown grant
did not carry the right to exclusive possession harks back to this feudal ideal
of the co-existence of interests in land. Under the feudal system, several
parties had interests in the same land. These interests were substantive in the
sense that they gave the holder - namely, the Crown, tenant in chief, mesne
lord or tenant in demesne" - rights to services, produce or money.
In this respect, the co-existence approach amounts to a re-feudalisation
of Australian land law. Unlike the aspects of re-feudalisation discussed
above, however, this aspect of the phenomenon works to the advantage of
13

168 Yarmirrat 438.
169 Ward at 510.
170 Ibid at 553-562, 579-580, 616-626. Much of the judgment of Lee J in Ward was
concerned with the effect of the reservation of parts of the claimed land by the
Crown, rather than the effect of Crown grants to third parties. In certain

instances where land reserved by the Crown was subsequently leased to third
parties, LeeJ found that it was the reservation of the land, and its commitment
by the Crown to a particular purpose, rather than the grant of the lease itself,
which resulted in the complete extinguishment of native title (at 593-594, 602).
171 See Fejo at 756 per KirbyJ.
172 See the discussion of the relationship between 'possession' and 'title' in the
judgment of TooheyJ in Mabo at 207-211.
173 See FW Maitland, 'The Mystery of Seisin' (1886) 2 LQR 481.

174 Butt (1996) para 1618. Also see Bursill Enterprises Pty Ltd v Berger Bros Trading
Co Pty Ltd (1971) 124 CLR 73 at 91, 93 per WindeyerJ.

175 See AJ Bradbrook et al (1997) Australian Real PropertyLaw, 2" edn, LBC, para
2.02.
176 Macpherson (1975) p 110.
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Indigenous people, at least when compared to the possibility of complete
extinguishment.
Conclusion
We have seen that the common law construct of native title has received the
attributes of a feudal-like property interest through the operation of various
oppositional categories. With regard to the public/private dialectic, the
construct of native title inhabits the private sphere of property rights, rather
than the public sphere of a sovereign right to self-determination. Yet a
condition has been attached to the recognition of native title: the continued
observance of a traditional lifestyle by the native titleholders. This very
closely parallels the public sphere notion of land ownership being contingent upon the performance of some social function, which underpinned
feudal landholding.
As far as the stasis/dynamism dialectic is concerned, the recognition of
native title is itself evidence of the capacity for change of common property
rights. However, the limitations which the common law imposes upon the
land uses protected by native title, and the restrictions imposed on alienation, give native title a static aspect reminiscent of the limited nature of
feudal interests in land. We have seen how this contrasts with the common
law's own abandonment of land ownership as a contingent and limited
phenomenon.
Finally, in respect of the transcendence/enslavement dialectic, the
susceptibility of native title to unilateral extinguishment by inconsistent
interests subsequently granted by the Crown shows how the common law
construct is subordinated to the common law's own vision of property.
However, we have seen that the construct of native title is able to co-exist
with other property interests that do not carry the right to exclusive possession. We have also seen that courts have actually been prepared to find that
certain other interests in land do not carry the right to exclusive possession.
This demonstrates a transcendence of the common law's vision of property
as dominated by the concept of exclusive possession. This also harks back to
the feudal era where co-existence of various interests in the same land - each
reflecting a particular social function"' - was the hallmark of feudal
landholding.
The 'politics' of landholding under the feudal doctrine of tenure is
described by Edgeworth as follows.
All those who hold interests in land are 'tenants' of the Crown as
much as they are political subjects: their titles are deemed in theory to
have originated in a Crown grant. They are therefore not
autonomous landowners excluding the state as they would be under
serve by means of
an allodial system. Rather, they are included and
178
the (now invisible) ties of service to the Crown.

177 TP Fry, 'Land Tenures in Australian Law' (1947) 3 ResJudicatae 158, pp 16970.

178 Edgeworth (1994) p 425.
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Native title is, of course, an allodial interest; it is not derived from a
Crown grant and it is not burdened by feudal services and incidents."'
However, we have seen that the substance of the common law construct of
native title as an interest in land - in terms of the range of protected uses, its
non-alienability and its susceptibility to extinguishment by a subsequent
Crown grant - bears the mark of subordination to, rather than autonomy
from, a political overlord in the form of the Crown. In this respect, the way
in which the common law has constructed 'native title' constitutes a refeudalisation of Australian land law.
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